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Reluctant altruism and peer pressure in charitable giving
Diane Reyniers∗ Richa Bhalla†
Abstract
Subjects donate individually (control group) or in pairs (treatment group). Those in pairs reveal their donation deci-
sion to each other. Average donations in the treatment group are significantly higher than in the control group. Paired
subjects have the opportunity to revise their donation decision after discussion. Pair members shift toward each others’
initial decisions. Subjects are happier with their decision when their donations are larger, but those in pairs are less
happy, controlling for amount donated. These findings suggest reluctant altruism due to peer pressure in charitable
giving.
Keywords: charitable giving, altruism, peer pressure, happiness.
1 Introduction
Fundraisers know that social pressure affects pro-social
behaviour. Past donors are asked to solicit additional do-
nations; university alumni are encouraged to contact and
motivate others in their cohort (Meer & Rosen, 2011);
charity events often require participants to raise a cer-
tain amount of money from friends and relatives. The
use of giving websites that rely on peer pressure is a sig-
nificant recent development in this area. The website
http://www.justgiving.com, set up in 2000, invites visi-
tors to create and personalise a giving webpage, which
tracks fundraising goals and progress for a chosen char-
ity and can be shared with friends and family. This site
has been used by 13m people and has raised over £770m.
Fundraising and donating to charity is free on this web-
site but charity members (over 9,000 charities are regis-
tered) pay a transaction fee of 5% (plus credit and debit
card fees) on each donation and a monthly membership
fee of £15+VAT. The customer who sets up the page ex-
erts direct peer pressure on the lucky friends and relatives
who are asked to donate. There is also indirect pressure
among potential donors who, when they view the identity
of donors and the size of their gift, may be compelled to
donate in equal measure, especially since each donation
(or lack of it) is public.
The website http://www.virginmoneygiving.com, set
up in 2009, also allows users to create personalised web-
pages dedicated to fundraising events, personal chal-
lenges or other special occasions and share those pages
with friends and relatives. Customers creating pages and
potential donors can view an up-to-date list of sponsors
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and the sizes of their gifts. Use of the site is free to donors
and fundraisers but charges apply to registered charities
who pay a one-off flat joining fee (£100 +VAT) and the
site takes a 2% commission on donations to cover operat-
ing costs.
Why are these sites so popular? Clearly, charities
would not register unless they expect to recuperate the
joining fee and commission from increased income. Cus-
tomers are aware that donations are subject to commis-
sion but they probably believe they can raise more money
this way than by asking friends to donate to a charity di-
rectly. People may also use these websites to broadcast
their contribution to society; emailing friends and rela-
tives and asking them to donate directly to charity would
not provide such publicity or boasting opportunity.
The success of giving websites illustrates that there are
motives other than altruism for pro-social behaviour. An
enormous literature in psychology and economics dis-
cusses what drives people to give. There is consider-
able evidence that the main driver of giving or helping
behaviour is an emotion like empathy or sympathy or
compassion (see, e.g., Coke et al., 1978; Eisenberg &
Miller, 1987). The extent to which these emotions are
felt depends on a number of factors, including one’s own
personal state, past experience, proximity, similarity and
vividness (Loewenstein & Small, 2007), e.g., emotional
arousal (empathy and distress) is higher when attention is
drawn to single, identified victims and donation requests
of this type elicit considerably more contributions than
requests for a more general cause, disease or catastrophe
affecting many people (see e.g., Small & Loewenstein,
2003; Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b, 2007; Small et al.,
2007).
There is, however, debate (e.g., Batson et al., 1989)
about the potential mechanisms underlying the relation-
ship between empathy and giving and in particular about
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whether the ultimate motive for giving is purely altruistic
or egoistic. Do people give simply because they want to
increase the welfare of others or do they give in order to
gain rewards or avoid punishments?
Batson and his co-authors (e.g., Batson et al., 1989)
make the case for pure altruism and claim that prosocial
behaviour resulting from empathy is directed towards the
benefit of those one feels empathy for rather than only to-
wards obtaining rewards (praise, pride) or avoiding pun-
ishments (guilt, shame).
Collard (1978) and Cialdini and his co-authors (see
e.g., Cialdini et al., 1973; Cialdini & Kenrick, 1976; Cial-
dini et al., 1982; Kenrick et al. 1979), are firmly in the
egoistic camp, arguing that the ultimate goal of giving is
only benefit to the self. Such benefit arises in the follow-
ing forms:
1. Alleviating aversive arousal: Cialdini et al. (1973)
propose a negative state relief model of helping: em-
pathy or compassion increases sadness and it is the
egoistic desire to relieve sadness which motivates
helping. Helping is thus instrumental to restoring
mood (see also Cialdini et al., 1982; Rosenhan et
al., 1981; Baumann et al., 1981; Manucia et al.,
1984). In Cialdini et al.’s (1987) Experiment 1 high
empathy subjects help more except when they had
received a sadness-cancelling reward. In their Ex-
periment 2, high empathy subjects who were given
a placebo mood fixing drug (which made them be-
lieve their sad mood could not be alleviated by help-
ing) did not help more than low empathy subjects.
However, Batson (1990) points to a body of evi-
dence suggesting that high empathy subjects will of-
fer high levels of help even when escape is easy.
2. Anticipating feeling good about oneself (maintain-
ing or enhancing self-image) or avoiding feeling bad
(guilt): Andreoni (1989, 1990, 2001) has written
extensively about the psychological benefits (warm
glow) associated with giving. Using survey data
from 136 countries, Aknin et al. (2010) show that
prosocial spending universally leads to emotional
benefits for donors. Konow and Earley (2008) find
a correlation between happiness and generosity—
dictators who share experience more long run hap-
piness and happy subjects are more likely to share—
but conclude that psychological well being is the
primary cause of both happiness and dictator gen-
erosity. In an experiment designed to disentangle
causality, Dunn et al. (2008) find that students ran-
domly assigned to spend money on others are signif-
icantly happier than those assigned to spend money
on themselves.
3. Anticipating receiving social rewards or avoiding
social punishments: If prosocial behaviour (or the
lack thereof) is publicly observed, social consider-
ations such as gaining prestige (Harbaugh, 1998;
Ariely et al., 2009) or avoiding shame may mat-
ter. Individuals with higher social desirability con-
cerns help more. Altruism can be instrumental in
signalling wealth or status (see e.g., Becker, 1974;
Glazer & Konrad, 1996; Griskevicius et al., 2007).
There is ample evidence that peer pressure or even
the mere knowledge that others are contributing
increases contributions (see e.g., Cialdini, 1984).
Showing prospective donors a (fictitious) list of pre-
vious donors increases compliance and donations
(Reingen, 1978). Several field experiments have
shown that contributions to public goods or char-
ity can be manipulated by providing participants
with information on others’ contributions (see, e.g.,
Shang & Croson, 2009, on donations to a public ra-
dio station and Frey & Meier, 2004, on charity do-
nations). The presence of peers can have a strong
influence on the choice between selfish and selfless
behaviour. Andreoni and Scholz (1998) find that
neighbours’ (defined by socio-demographic space)
donations have a measurable effect on household
giving. Andreoni and Petrie (2004) and Rege and
Telle (2004) find that unmasking subjects and their
donations in a public good game significantly in-
creases contributions. In a field experiment at a
Costa Rican national park, Alpizar et al. (2008) find
that voluntary contributions in public in front of the
solicitor are 25% higher than those made in private.
Image concerns may be particularly salient if the ob-
server of one’s generosity (or lack thereof) is an ac-
quaintance or a friend. Meer (2009) finds that both
the decision to give and the amount donated are af-
fected by the existence of social ties and shared char-
acteristics between the solicitor and the donor. Rein-
stein and Riener (2012) show that even a superficial
acquaintance can significantly affect donation deci-
sions. In a similar experimental setup to ours, par-
ticipants could choose to give some, all, or none of
their endowment to a real charity. The experiment
started with a meet and greet session among partici-
pants. Leaders (first movers) and followers (second
movers) are observed in a range of anonymity sce-
narios. When a leader’s donation and identity are
revealed to the follower, the follower’s donation in-
creases directly with the leader’s. When the dona-
tion is revealed without the leader’s identity, how-
ever, no such impact is observed. Mujcic and Fri-
jters (2011) find that car commuters act more self-
ishly when they are alone and display greater altru-
istic behavior when passengers are present. This,
however, could be due to the two groups having dif-
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ferent personality traits: those in cars with passen-
gers may be intrinsically more altruistic than those
travelling alone. This type of issue highlights the
role of controlled experiments in this field. There is
a psychology literature which shows that even a very
minimal social cue such as watching eyes (three dots
in the configuration of a simple face) has a positive
effect on giving. In Haley and Fessler’s (2005) dic-
tator games, if the computer screen displays stylized
eye spots, twice as many subjects give than in the
control group (see also Rigdon et al., 2009; Bateson
et al., 2006 and Burnham & Hare, 2007).
The contribution of our paper is as follows. In line with
the literature we find strong evidence of peer effects and
the impact of social desirability concerns. We also find
that more generous donors are happier with their donation
decision. Our focus is however on how donors’ happiness
with their decision is affected by peer pressure.
Some recent literature discusses avoidance of giving.
Several studies use exit options in a dictator game to il-
lustrate such avoidance. Dana et al.‘s (2006) subjects are
offered a choice between a $10 dictator game and a $9
exit option (if exit is chosen the recipient does not find
out about the game). Rational subjects should demand
at least $10 to exit but a substantial fraction of subjects
(about one third) choose to exit at $9. Broberg et al.
(2007) find that the mean exit reservation price equals
82% of the dictator’s endowment. Again, only about one
third of subjects demand the full endowment or more to
exit. Lazear et al. (2012) find that when forced to play a
dictator game, over 60% of subjects share but when of-
fered the option to avoid the game altogether (without the
potential recipient finding out) less than a quarter of sub-
jects share. These findings suggest that (some) people
feel uncomfortable about being asked to give and are pre-
pared to forego payoffs to avoid being in that situation.
Making a choice of how much to give may be considered
uncomfortable. The anticipation of discomfort with any
resulting inequality may be unpleasant. Yet another ex-
planation is that subjects know they would give too much.
The study most closely related to our work is Della
Vigna et al.’s (2012) field study which investigates the ef-
fect of door-to-door solicitation on donors’ welfare. They
vary the extent to which households are made aware of
a forthcoming fundraising drive. Some households re-
ceive a flyer informing them of the exact time of solici-
tation (thereby allowing them to avoid solicitation), oth-
ers are also provided with an “opt out” box if they don’t
want to be solicited, and a control group is approached
in the usual way without any prior warning in the form
of a flyer. A significant proportion of warned households
do not answer the door and also (when possible) check
the box requesting no solicitation. The findings also sug-
gest that those who ticked the “do not disturb” box would
have made a small contribution in the absence of a warn-
ing about solicitation.
A recent newspaper article,1 entitled “Stop asking me
for charity money!”, contains the following quotes, which
illustrate how some people feel about sponsorship and do-
nation requests:
“I hate being made to feel as though I don’t
care if I don’t respond to my friends’ requests
for sponsorship.”
“. . . who gives £2 once they are on the on-
line pledge page and see everyone else’s gift of
a tenner or more?”
“I hate it when my friends ask me to do-
nate.”
“Please don’t lay a guilt trip about it on me
just to get me to sponsor you.”
“I ended up donating money I could ill af-
ford.”
Clearly not everyone gives to charity freely, and, whilst
we don’t wish to claim that other motivations don’t play
an important role, we argue that peer pressure is effective
in generating donations but those donations may reflect
reluctant altruism.
2 Experimental design
We recruited 211 students at the London School of Eco-
nomics via email, inviting them to take part in a short
survey in return for £10. As part of the survey, subjects
were asked whether they wished to donate any of their
newly earned cash to charity. The questionnaire con-
tained a list of five charities (Oxfam, Cancer Research,
Red Cross, Demelza and RSPCA) along with a brief de-
scription of each charity. Subjects selected one charity
and could choose to donate £1, £2,. . . , £10.
The survey was relatively short and consisted of a brief
set of demographic details along with a personality ques-
tionnaire. We also asked subjects how much money they
had donated to charity in the last year. Subjects indicated
their level of agreement with the statement “I care about
what others think of me”, which we used to measure im-
age concern. In addition, subjects were asked to guess the
average donation in the experiment. They were told that
the person making the most accurate guess of the aver-
age donation would win a prize (a £50 Amazon voucher).
The guess of others’ donations was made prior to sub-
jects’ own donation decision.
At the time of recruitment, subjects were given a time
slot. Subjects were randomly allocated to individual and
1http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-1285460/
Stop-asking-charity-money.html.
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pair time slots. There were 108 subjects (54 pairs) in the
treatment group and 103 subjects in the control group.
Subjects in the control group were asked to make their do-
nation decision on their own while those in the pair treat-
ment made two donation decisions. Before making their
initial donation decision, individuals in the pair treatment
were instructed that their donation decision would be re-
vealed to their partner. After they made their donation de-
cision privately, they were given two minutes to discuss
their decision. They then had the opportunity to revise
their donation decision. They were informed that their fi-
nal decision would again be revealed to their partner. Al-
though pairs were told at the start of the survey that their
donation decision would be revealed to their partner, they
were not aware that they would be given the opportunity
to revise their donation decision.
Pairs and individuals were given fifteen minutes to
complete the survey. Pair members sat in the same room
to fill out the survey but did so privately (the only time
subjects were allowed to communicate was during the
pairs discussion period). Subjects in the control group
completed the survey privately in a room without any
other participants.
Once they had made their donation decision, all sub-
jects were asked how happy they were with their choice
(for the treatment group this was asked twice: once after
the first donation decision, but before the discussion, and
once after the second donation decision).
After filling out the survey, subjects were paid the
amount they had decided to keep.
3 Results
3.1 Treatment effect
3.1.1 Pair donations are larger than control group
donations
Paired subjects’ mean first round donation is significantly
higher than the control group average. On average, pair
subjects donate £3.64 while control group subjects donate
£2.55 (p=0.02).2
In Table 1, column (1), the dependent variable, Do-
nation 1, represents the first round donation decision of
paired subjects and the only donation decision of control
group subjects. We asked subjects to state the amount
they had donated to charity in the last year. Out of 211
participants, 47 reported having donated £0, 103 donated
between £0 and £50, and 61 donated £50 or more. We
will refer to the last category as substantial donors.3 Im-
2All tests are two-sided t-tests with unequal variances.
3The distribution of the amount donated (outside the experiment) is
very skewed with some subjects reporting donations over £2,000. We
decided to dichotomise this variable to control for “substantial dona-
Table 1: Regression results for Donation 1 and Zero Do-
nation. Coefficients are unstandardized.
(1) (2)
Donation 1 Zero Donation
Substantial
donors
1.005** (0.488) −0.127* (0.071)
Image
concern
0.716*** (0.240) −0.059* (0.035)
Pair 1.161** (0.444) −0.135** (0.065)
Constant −0.229 (0.908) 0.651*** (0.132)
R2 0.085 0.047
Number of
observations
211 211
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***
indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, re-
spectively. Coefficients in column (2) are based on or-
dinary regression, but the results are similar for probit
regression.
age concern indicates the level of agreement (5 point
Likert scale) with the statement “I care about what oth-
ers think of me”. Pair is a dummy variable indicating
whether the subject is in the treatment group. Note that
the effect of pair is also significant by a simple t test
(p=.02).
Substantial donors give significantly (£1) more than
others. Image concern has a significant and large ef-
fect on donation. Paired subjects give significantly more
(£1.16) controlling for image concern and whether they
are subtantial donors.
3.1.2 Fewer zero donations in pairs
The treatment effect is largely due to a significantly lower
proportion of zero donations in the pair treatment.4 Over-
all, 72 subjects out of 211 donated £0. Out of 103 people
in the control group, 42 donated £0 (41%), and out of 108
paired subjects, 30 donated £0 (28%).
As can be seen in Table 1, column (2), substantial
donors are 13% less likely to donate zero. Paired subjects
are significantly (13%) less likely to donate zero control-
ling for whether they are substantial donors and image
concern.
tions” (a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the subject has donated
at least £50). Including a second dummy variable for “zero donations”
does not change the results and the coefficient on this dummy is not
significant.
4For those who donated positive amounts, mean donations were
£4.31 for the control group versus £4.91 for paired subjects (p=0.25),
still lower but not statistically significant.
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The finding of fewer non-donors in the pair treat-
ment is consistent with Dickert et al. (2011), who in
their two stage processing model of donations, argue that
mood management motivation is important in the deci-
sion whether to donate or not whereas the actual amount
donated depends on more altruistic empathy feelings.
Genuine altruism or empathy (which affects amount do-
nated) can be assumed to be equal in both groups of sub-
jects. However, mood management differs between the
two groups. Paired subjects may have anticipated more
shame if they did not donate.
Although Table 1 provides evidence for the treatment
effect, the explanatory power of the models for donation
and zero donation is low. Clearly, participation in char-
itable giving and the level of donations is affected by a
number of variables not included in this study. Jones and
Posnett (1991), for example, find that household partici-
pation in charitable giving depends on income, education,
house tenure and region whereas the level of donation de-
pends mainly on income.
3.1.3 False consensus effect
Frey and Meier (2004) discuss the false consensus phe-
nomenon (e.g., Ross et al., 1976) in the context of charity
donations: individual preferences regarding contribution
may influence expectations about pro-social behaviour of
others, and vice versa, beliefs about how much others
contribute can affect subjects’ donations.5 We asked sub-
jects to guess the average donation made by participants
in this study prior to making their own donation decision.
We found a high correlation between subjects’ guesses
and their own donations (0.54, p<0.001). Our subjects
anticipated the treatment effect in the sense that those in
pairs guessed significantly higher than those in the con-
trol group (£4.37 versus £3.64, p=0.03). Both groups
over-estimated their peers’ generosity: 55% of subjects
donated less than their guess and the average guess (£4)
was significantly (p<0.001) higher than the actual mean
donation level (£3), so, on average, subjects must think
that they are less generous than others. This finding
is in contrast with Muehleman et al. (1976) and Kogut
and Beyth-Marom (2008), who find that subjects con-
sider themselves more generous than their peers. How-
ever, in these studies participants were asked hypotheti-
cal questions about their own and other’s inclination to
help whereas in our study subjects had to decide to ac-
tually help or not. Abstract stimuli may be more likely
than concrete situations to generate a better than average
effect.
5There is a wealth of evidence that projection bias occurs indepen-
dent of the order in which questions on self and others are asked (e.g.,
Mullen et al., 1985).
Table 2: Regression results for Donation 2.
(1) (2)
Donation 2 Change in
donation
Donation 1 0.868*** (0.054)
Partner’s
donation 1
0.128** (0.055)
Partner’s
donation 1
minus own
donation 1
0.130*** (0.046)
Constant −0.059 (0.180) −0.074 (0.157)
R2 0.771 0.133
Number of
observations
108 108
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***
indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, re-
spectively.
3.2 Peer effect
3.2.1 Effect of partner’s first round donation on sec-
ond round donation
In Table 2, column (1), Donation 2 is the second round
donation of paired subjects. Donation 1 is their first round
donation and Partner’s donation 1 is their partner’s first
round donation. Partner’s first round donation has a sig-
nificant impact on second round donation. Not surpris-
ingly, first round donation has a strong effect on second
round donation.
In column (2) we regress change in donation between
second and first round on the difference between own
and partner donation in the first round. Being paired
with a more generous donor significantly increases sec-
ond round donations.
3.2.2 Change in donations
The change from first donation to second donation ranged
from−£10 to +£5. A large majority of subjects (78%) did
not change their donation decision at all. Out of 54 pairs,
in 32 pairs neither subject changed their donation deci-
sion, in 20 pairs one changed and in 2 pairs both changed.
Subjects whose partners donated more than them in the
first round significantly increased their donation by £0.55
on average. And subjects whose partners donated less
than them in the first round significantly decrease their
donation by £0.72. In the 7 pairs where subjects’ first
round donations were equal, neither subject changed his
or her donation decision. Out of the 47 subjects whose
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partners’ first round donation exceeds theirs, only one
changed to a lower donation, and, similarly, only one out
of the 47 subjects whose partner’s first round donation
was below their own changed to a higher level of dona-
tion.
3.2.3 The extreme subjects
It is well known that individuals tend to conform to a
social norm even when their preferences are heteroge-
neous but agents with sufficiently extreme preferences
tend not to conform (Bernheim 1994): subjects at the
extreme (choosing to donate either £0 or £10 in the first
round) were less likely to change their donation decisions
than subjects who were not extreme (donating between
£0 and £10 in the first round). 89% of the extreme donors
did not change versus 70% of the non-extreme donors
(p=0.02). This effect is in line with Frey and Meier’s
(2004) findings. In their study, individuals who have do-
nated on some occasions and not on other occasions are
labelled as indifferent. These are the people who are most
likely to change their behaviour. Those who never con-
tributed do not change their behaviour, while those who
are indifferent react most strongly to information on oth-
ers’ behaviour. A similar result is found in Andreoni and
Petrie (2004) who discuss fundraisers’ intuition that there
are three groups of people—those who never contribute,
those who always contribute and those who can be per-
suaded by social pressure.
3.3 Happiness with donation decisions
Our subjects were generally happier with their donation
decision, the higher the amount donated, but those in
pairs were significantly less happy with their donation de-
cision when controlling for amount donated. We know
that paired subjects donated more. The fact that they are
unhappier with their donation decision suggests that sub-
jects in pairs may have felt coerced to donate more than
they would have in the absence of a peer.
In Table 3, column (1), the dependent variable, Happy,
represents the level of agreement (5 point Likert scale)
with the statement “I am happy with my donation deci-
sion”. For pairs, it refers to their response after their final
decision. Donation 2 refers to the only donation decision
for the control group and the second donation decision for
paired subjects. Donation has a significant, positive effect
on happiness levels. But paired subjects feel significantly
less happy with their decision, controlling for donation.
(The difference without the control for donation was in
the same direction but not significant.)
Table 3: Regression results for Happy.
Donation 2 0.079*** (0.017)
Pair −0.250** (0.110)
Constant 4.099 (0.089)
R-squared 0.107
Number of observations 211
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
4 Conclusion
In our experiment, subjects donate an amount up to £10
(their show-up fee). One group of subjects donates on
their own (control group) and another group of paired
subjects makes a final (second) donation decision after
conferring with their partner and revealing their own ini-
tial donation decision (treatment group). Before making
their initial donation decision, subjects in the pair treat-
ment are aware that their donation decision will be re-
vealed to their partner. We find a significant pure treat-
ment effect: paired subjects’ mean first round donation
is significantly higher than the control group average.
On average, pair subjects donate £3.64 whereas control
group subjects donate £2.55. This treatment effect is
largely due to a significantly lower proportion of zero do-
nations in the pair treatment. This latter finding ties in
with Dickert et al.’s (2011) two stage model of charita-
ble donating: the decision whether to donate (as opposed
to the second stage decision of how much to donate) is
driven by mood management. In the pair treatment, sub-
jects are exposed to shame if they do not donate, hence a
higher proportion makes a positive donation.
Within the treatment group of pairs we observe signif-
icant peer effects which result in some convergence of
pair donation decisions. Each subject in a pair makes two
donation decisions, one before conferring with his part-
ner and one after. In the pairs where first round dona-
tions are equal, neither subject changes his donation de-
cision. In the other pairs, subjects, on average, move their
donation decision towards their partner’s. Andreoni and
Petrie (2004) report convergence of contributions in a re-
peated public good game. Presence of leaders (high con-
tributions) increases and presence of laggards (low contri-
butions) decreases other group members’ contributions.
Such conditional cooperation is extensively explored in
the literature on contributions to public goods, and is re-
lated to peer effects in charitable giving. There is a subtle
difference however: in public goods experiments, sub-
jects stand to potentially gain from the common public
good if they contribute, so they may contribute because
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they do not want to be seen to be a free rider. In chari-
table giving experiments, in contrast, subjects do not di-
rectly benefit from donations and hence there is no free
rider stigma.
We also found heterogeneity in peer pressure effects:
extreme donors (those who donated nothing and those
who donated all of their endowment) are less suscepti-
ble to peer pressure, they are less likely to change their
donations.
The final part of our analysis is concerned with the
“happiness” associated with subjects’ donation decisions.
In particular, we investigate whether the increase in dona-
tions due to peer pressure is accompanied by lower com-
fort levels of the (more generous) paired donors. Sub-
jects are generally happier with their donation decision
the higher the amount they donate but those in pairs are
significantly less happy with their donation decision con-
trolling for amount donated. This result suggests that sub-
jects in pairs may have felt coerced to donate more than
they would have in the absence of a peer, a sign of “re-
luctant altruism”.
In our experiment, the extent to which subjects care
about what others think of them affects donations. The
focus of our paper is however not the existence of social
image or peer effects, although we find strong evidence
of both of these effects. The contribution of our paper
is the investigation of subjects’ comfort levels with their
donation decisions in the presence of peer pressure. If
people give more due to social influence, does that make
them more or less happy with their donations? Peer ef-
fects in charitable giving may arise from lack of informa-
tion needed to make decisions. Information from peers
may be important when deciding how much to give and
whether to give, especially if subjects are unaware of any
norm. However, if the main effect of peer presence is pro-
vision of information then subjects should be more com-
fortable with their donation decisions when they have re-
ceived such information. Our result that paired subjects
are less happy with their decision indicates that informa-
tion provision is not the main driver of peer effects in
charitable giving.
Peer pressure has a significant effect on giving be-
haviour. Merely increasing the number of observers from
one (the experimenter) to two (the experimenter and a
peer) increases donations by over 40%. It is not surpris-
ing that giving websites which exploit peer pressure ef-
fects are popular. Our results suggest that a good strat-
egy for street fundraisers (chuggers) is to approach pairs
rather than single pedestrians. Pairs may feel more social
pressure to stop and donate. Individuals raising money
via sponsorship forms or giving webpages may find it
easier to raise money by, say, approaching friends in
groups. However, our findings represent a health warning
in this context: pressure leads to increased donations but
it reduces donors’ comfort levels. Potential giving web-
site customers may want to ask themselves whether they
care enough about their charitable cause to compensate
for the unease inflicted on their friends.
Although peer pressure is effective in generating do-
nations, charities might want to consider the longer term
effects of using peer pressure strategies. We found that
donors who give more due to peer pressure are less happy
about their donation. In addition, it is possible that a
donor who rationalises his donation decision as instru-
mental in avoiding shame will not attribute his giving be-
haviour to caring about the cause.6 Both of these phe-
nomena make future donations less likely.
Whilst capturing some essential features of giving
websites, our experimental design does not mimic that
environment perfectly. Our paired subjects are publicly
invited to donate, whereas on a giving site there is no ev-
idence of who received a request, although a fundraiser
could make this information public by sending the invi-
tation to donate on the site in a mass email revealing the
identity of all potential donors. It would be interesting to
see whether donations can be increased by having public
lists of potential donors on the webpage with their dona-
tions initially set at zero.
A possible extension of our study is to look at the ef-
fect of peer pressure in larger groups. We found some
evidence of a desire to conform in our paired subjects. It
would be interesting to examine these dynamics in larger
groups. Increased heterogeneity in groups may reduce
pressure to conform but being observed by several peers
may increase it. The effect of a larger number of subjects
on donation levels would be of interest in itself. Various
possible motives could be present to generate a higher
level of donations but there is a possibility that donations
would decrease in larger groups if subjects feel that their
own contribution is less significant as in the bystander ef-
fect.
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